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Chapter 13
The Peruvian Pension Reform:
Ailing or Failing?
Eliana Carranza and Eduardo Morón
In 1992 Peru followed the example of Chile and implemented a fully
funded pension scheme, becoming the second country in Latin America
to reform its pension system. The Peruvian reform shows three notable
characteristics: (a) the public pension system was not closed—it continues
to operate alongside the private one; (b) coverage is limited; and (c)
competition in the privatized system appears to be limited.
First, the decision to maintain rather than eliminate the public pension
system introduced several distortions to the overall functioning of the new
mandatory pillar. These distortions have been obstacles to the reform’s suc-
cess. Political demands to return to the old public scheme are common—
each year legislative initiatives are introduced to revise the private pension
system. Most of these proposed reforms are aimed at reducing profits for
the private pension funds rather than enhancing the performance of the
private system, improving the fiscal situation, or meeting the needs of
workers.
Second, the original objective of the pension reform was to provide more
secure coverage than the public pension system. However, this objective
has been met for only a small fraction of the workforce. In this respect,
the government could participate more actively to expand coverage to
individuals in the informal sector.
Third, Congress has discussed many initiatives to reduce profits in the
private pension system rather than addressing the more urgent policy ques-
tion of how to both increase competition and guarantee a secure pension
benefit without creating excess market distortion. These challenges present
no easy solution, as the government has the upper hand in the regulation
process and the pension system provides an easy way to finance the fiscal
gap. Consequently, the government has an incentive to trade long-term
stability for short-term objectives.
Our gratitude to Lucero Burga, who helped with tables and figures, and to Tapen Sinha and
Stephen J. Kay for their invaluable comments and suggestions. This paper represents only the
personal views of the authors and not necessarily those of our institutions.
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This chapter analyzes the pension system as a whole, considering both
the mandatory private and public systems,1 provides a preliminary assess-
ment of the reform thus far, and analyzes potential reforms for the pension
system.
The Pension System before the Reform
Government pensions date back nearly to Peru’s independence. In 1850
the government sanctioned the Ley de Goces, or the Benefits Law, which
created special pension benefits for a select group of public officials and
citizens that served in the wars of independence.2
The mandatory public pension system started in 1936. Over the follow-
ing decades, the system has undergone numerous modifications. Initially
designed exclusively for private-sector workers, it was partially financed by
taxes and contributions from employers, employees, and the government.
In 1962 the system was extended to public employees; by 1973 most of
the existing pension systems were consolidated into a single PAYGO public
pension system called the DL 19990 regime.3 There were two main excep-
tions: the Caja de Pensiones Militar-Policial, which still covers all military
and police personnel, and the so-called Cédula Viva, a privileged pen-
sion scheme for high-ranking officers, which the government attempted
unsuccessfully to close in 1974 by DL 20530.4 Despite their differences, all
the pension systems suffered from public pension fund mismanagement.
Their sustainability was jeopardized by fiscally irresponsible governments
that borrowed from pension funds to cover current expenditures and
infrastructure projects, while high inflation wiped out the real value of
pension funds.
In 1985 DL 19990 pensions covered only 34 percent of the EAP. The
combination of a severe economic crisis and the reform of public-sector
enterprises dramatically changed the labor market, tilting the coverage
balance even more. Whereas, in 1990 two-thirds of the labor force had
permanent jobs, one decade later this figure was just one-third. (Workers in
the informal sector of course do not contribute to pension plans.) Growth
in the informal sector is one of the most salient characteristics of the
Peruvian economy.5 By 1992 coverage had fallen to barely 21 percent of
the EAP (see Carranza and Morón 2003: 21).
According to Mesa-Lago (1985), before the trough of the economic crisis
in 1985, the Peruvian public pension system was already characterized as
one in which (a) coverage was low (only 38% of the EAP, compared to
61% for Latin America as a region); (b) noncompliance with contributions
was widespread; (c) the age structure of the affiliates was young (Peru had
only 3.6% of its population older than 65 years, compared to 4.2% in the
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Figure 13-1. Coverage and informality in Latin America pre-reform (1985)
(Source: Mesa-Lago 1985).
region); (d) pension benefit levels were not excessive—though this was not
the case with the DL 20530 regime; (e) returns were significantly negative;
and ( f ) recordkeeping was poor.
Low coverage is explained by the size of the formal sector: only 45
percent of the EAP were wage earners (Mesa-Lago 1985). The same pattern
was true for the rest of Latin America (see Figure 13-1).
In sum, the public pension system suffered a severe mismanagement
problem as the pension funds were subject to imprudent government
policies. These problems were compounded when the demographic boom
receded and a large share of younger workers migrated to other countries.
Finally, government intervention in the market was biased toward the
shrinking urban and formal labor market, which constitutes a minority of
the workforce.
The Reform6
From a political economy perspective, some conditions are more conducive
to reform than others. For example, it is easier to pass a reform if (a) the
leader has an ample majority in Congress; (b) the president has recently
been elected and is enjoying a honeymoon effect; (c) the group of ben-
eficiaries will receive its benefits in the short run, whereas the costs are
lumped in the long run; or (d) there is a clear consensus (see Brooks and
James 2001). None of these four conditions were true in 1992.
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Alberto Fujimori was elected president in July 1990 amid an economic
crisis and the threat of increasing political violence. Given the desperate
situation, he received political support for most of his political initiatives.
However, Fujimori did not engage in dialogue with the legislature, nor did
he pursue political alliances. He instead asked for special legislative powers
to pass reforms, only explaining his decisions afterwards. Fujimori received
ample legislative powers to pass a long list of reforms in the second half
of 1991. In one week, the government issued more than fifty legislative
decrees promoting private-sector participation in several sectors in the
economy, including the pension reform (DL 724).
The early months of Fujimori’s presidency were a time of major con-
frontation between the president and the Congress. Several decrees were
changed or repealed.7 One minister was censured and a motion to declare
the presidency vacant was almost passed. These conflicts ultimately led to
the April 1992 ‘self-coup’, when Fujimori dismissed the Congress. In this
complex political environment, the first attempt to reform the pension
system did not succeed.
Mounting international pressure for a swift return to democracy forced
the government to call for congressional elections. This put the pension
reform in peril, as the issue lost importance in the political agenda. It was
not until late 1992 that new legislation (DL 25897) was enacted to replace
the first initiative.
The urgency of pension reform was justified in terms of the overall fiscal
situation and the history of mismanagement of the public pension system.
These two factors implied an inability to finance public pensions, and the
pension reform was viewed as a way to avoid deeper fiscal problems. In this
sense, replacing the PAYGO system with a system of individual accounts
constituted one key element of the reform. Up to then, pensions were
not linked to contributions and instead depended on the fortunes (or
misfortunes) of the national treasury.
The reform did not bar workers from entering the public pension sys-
tem, as in Chile,8 due to mounting public opposition. The campaign to
maintain the public system was assisted by favorable public opinion of Luis
Castañeda, the manager of the agency running public pension and health
programs (the Instituto Peruano de Seguridad Social, or IPSS, now called
EsSalud). His managerial success undermined critics of the government’s
management of the pension system (although IPSS performance during
his tenure was not representative of its past).
The manager’s popularity explains why at that time it was considered
positive to continue the operations of the public pension system. IPSS’s
coexistence with the AFPs or private pension fund managers was justified
as a source of competition and as a way of disciplining the market.9 Workers
would voluntarily choose to join an AFP or the public pension system (El
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Sistema Nacional de Pensiones, or SNP), but those who joined an AFP
would also have to pay a solidarity contribution to the SNP to guarantee
its financial sustainability.
One of the most significant design problems of the initial reform pro-
posal was that workers had an incentive to stay at the SNP. The SNP offered
several advantages, including a lower contribution rate, a lower retirement
age, and an MPG—all of which the new system lacked. Meanwhile, recog-
nition bonds to compensate those joining the new system for contributions
made to the old public system were not implemented swiftly.10 Additionally,
workers who had chosen an AFP retained the option to move back to the
SNP. Hence, the growth of the new system was slow (see Arce 2001). By
the end of 1993, only 30 percent of workers with pension coverage were
affiliated with the private pension system.
In 1995 most of the initial deficiencies were corrected. Under DL 26504
the contribution rate of the SNP was raised to match that of the Sistema
Privado de Pensiones (SPP, or Private Pension System), the solidarity con-
tribution was eliminated, and the retirement age was standardized for both
men and women at 65 years. Also, the Oficina de Normalización Previsional
(ONP, or Office of Social Security Normalization) was created to manage
the SNP (replacing IPSS) and to expedite the recognition bonds process.
Moreover, to tilt the balance toward the SPP, new employees had to select
their affiliation preferences (SNP or a particular AFP) within a certain
period; otherwise, they were automatically enrolled in an AFP.
Despite all the changes, some important issues still needed to be
addressed, such as the implementation of a cap on mandatory contribu-
tions in the form of a taxable-wage ceiling, the possible phasing out of the
SNP, and the introduction of an MPG for the SPP. Though included in the
1995 law, the MPG was not implemented until 2001. The reduction in the
contribution rate from 10 to 8 percent that was intended as a temporary
measure to attract more affiliates to the SPP became more of a permanent
policy. Proposals to raise the contribution rate have been deferred year
after year.
In summary, the initial reform introduced a fully funded DC system
alongside an unfunded, fiscally unsustainable public system. The reform
was incomplete, and there has been space for continuous revisions of the
system. The politics of the reform have imposed great costs on the SPP:
(a) the SPP has to invest significant resources in defending its existence;
(b) its performance has been affected by changing the rules of the game;
and (c) the SPP had to compete with the SNP to attract the same pool of
workers but under unequal conditions and regulations. The experience of
the past ten years suggests that a better strategy for the government would
have been to complement the services provided by the private sector by
extending coverage to sectors difficult to reach.
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Evaluation of the Reforms
This section offers a preliminary evaluation of the pension system. A full
evaluation is problematic given the fact that the system is still in a transition
phase and is constantly changing.
Tables 13-1 and 13-2 provide a quick overview of the pension system as
a whole. The most significant accomplishment of the reform is simply that
it has endured, given the fact that policymaking in Peru is characterized
by constant reversals (see Morón and Sanborn 2006). New governments
have been prone to redo entire reforms regardless of the costs.11 However,
despite a strong and vocal group of opponents, the private pension system
endures.
This resilience is notable. After a natural consolidation process that
reduced the number of participants from eight AFPs to four, there was
no effect on the affiliates (see Figure 13-2). Moreover, the pension fund
has grown despite being tested by a series of major international economic
crises during the late 1990s as well as a domestic political crisis following
Fujimori’s abrupt departure in 2000.
Evidence of the reform’s progress can be found in the size of the funds
managed by the private pension system: US$9 billion (more than 12%
of the GDP). The rapid growth of pension fund assets has completely
transformed the financial system. Banks have been displaced as the main
providers of funding to the corporate sector. The government—after fixing
major macroeconomic imbalances—was able to introduce a domestic bond
market long awaited by the AFPs. Yet, in comparison with other reformed
private pension systems, the Peruvian system has a much lower concentra-
tion in government bonds (see Table 13-3). Whereas the average in the
region is close to 60 percent (in some countries, more than 80%), in Peru
only 25 percent of the portfolio is in government bonds.
The excessive dependence on government bonds that characterize the
rest of the reformed systems in the region highlights the fact that ‘private-
ness’ of the pension funds is relative. The only difference between those
private systems and the old PAYGO systems is that now the workers’ contri-
butions go to their individual accounts instead of a common pool. However,
the pension funds are still subject to regulatory capture and exposed to
government whims. The limited investment in government bonds is one of
the strengths of Peru’s reformed system.
Of the main failures of the reform, the most pressing is the low coverage
(see Table 13-4 for numbers on the region’s coverage). In a recent World
Bank study, Rofman and Carranza (2005) compute comparable coverage
figures using Latin-American household surveys. The low coverage figures
in Peru merit some explanation. First, Peru (along with Bolivia) is among
the countries with the largest shares of informal workers in its labor force,
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Table 13-1 The Peruvian Pension System after the 1992 Reform
National Pension System Private Pension System
Nature of the system PAYGO Individual capitalization
account
Administration National pension office
(ONP)
Pension funds administration
(AFP)
Mandatory
contribution
13% 8%
Voluntary
contributions
No voluntary
contributions
Voluntary contribution up to
20% of the wage are
deposited in the mandatory
CIC
— Those in excess of 20% of the
wage are deposited in
separate voluntary
retirement savings account
Fees as % of wage None, but it is not clear
how the 13% is
distributed between
retirement savings and
administration costs.
Administration fee: 2.27%
— Insurance prime: 0.95%
— —
Maximum taxable
wage
No ceiling No ceiling
Maximum pension
benefit
US$261 No ceiling
Minimum pension
benefit
For all workers, according
to the years of
contribution:
Since 2002, only for workers
that were born before 1945
US$81.14 if less than 5
years
A benefit of US$125 is
provided conditional on 20
years of contributions to any
of the pension system
US$92.55 if less than 10
years
—
US$104 if less than 20
years
—
US$125 if 20 years or more —
Retirement pensions According to the rules
that consider the
number and amount of
contributions registered
by the worker
As an annuity of the resources
accumulated in the CIC:
contributions and returns
to the pension fund.
Source: MEF (2004).
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Table 13-2 Pension System Indicators (December 2005)
SNP
DL 19990 DL 20530 a SPP
Affiliates (in thousands) 1,154 60 3,637
Contributors (% affiliates) 41 — 36
Pensioners (in thousands) 4,133 262 27
Annual pension payment (in millions $) 1,050 1,318 86
Receive minimum pension (% pensioners) 27 — 3.5
Annual contribution collection (in millions $) 217 — 1,058
Pension Fund (in millions $) — — 9,931
Sources: Authors’ own calculations based on data from ONP (n.d.), SBS (n.d.), and
MEF (2004).
a The figures in this column are from December 2004.
Dec. 1993
0.8% Affiliates
0.7%  Funds
21.9% Affiliates
32.3%  Funds
11.3% Affiliates
6.2%  Funds
12.2% Affiliates
19.3%  Funds
3.1% Affiliates
2.7%  Funds
12.1% Affiliates
16.8%  Funds
26.1% Affiliates
16.7%  Funds
12.4% Affiliates
5.2%  Funds
 August 1994: AFP
   Horizonte acquired
AFP Megafondo
September 1996:
AFP Profuturo 
acquired AFP El 
Roble 
  November 1994: AFP
  Nueva Vida acquired
  AFP Providencia
January 2000: AFP 
Unión merged with 
AFP Nueva Vida  
23.9% Affiliates
27.3% Funds
24.1% Affiliates
15.9% Funds
25.7% Affiliates
31.3% Funds
26.3% Affiliates
25.5%  Funds
Dec. 2004
Affiliated: 3,397,047
Total Funds :US$ 17.7 million
Horizonte
Integra
Unión Vida
Profuturo
Megafondo
Horizonte
El Roble
Profuturo
Integra
Unión
Providencia
Nueva Vida
Affiliates: 626.401
Total Funds :US$ 17.7 million
Figure 13-2. AFP mergers and acquisitions.
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Table 13-3 Investment of Pension Funds (as of December 2004)
Government
Sector
Corporate Sector Financial Sector Foreign Sector Others
Argentina 62.3 14.7 11.1 10.3 1.7
Bolivia 67.5 24.4 5.6 1.5 1.1
Chile 18.7 24.4 29.5 27.3 0.1
Colombiaa 48.5 19.6 21.1 9.7 1.1
Costa Rica 77.2 11.4 11.5 — —
El Salvador 83.5 0.3 10.5 5.5 —
Mexico 84.5 14.4 0.4 — —
Peru 24.5 45.2 20 10.3 0.1
Uruguay 79 5.2 7.5 — 8.3
Average 60.6 17.7 13 10.8 2.1
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FIAP (2005).
a The Colombian information includes only the mandatory pension system figures.
so the potential pension market is one of the narrowest.12 Second, the
reform law did not include incentives to increase coverage. For instance,
Peru was one of the last countries to extend the MPG to the private pillar,
and even then the guarantee is limited to affiliates born before 1945 with
20 years of contributions. Furthermore, contributions to the pension fund
are still taxable in Peru.
By some measurements, pension system coverage has diminished since
the introduction of the reform. However, measurements of coverage have
a serious limitation: they do not control for the level or the certainty of
Table 13-4 Coverage Rates
Contributors/
EAP
Contributors/
Employed Persons
Contributors/
Wage-Earners
Beneficiaries/
Population
Age 65+
Argentina (2003) 34.6 40.3 54.7 68.3
Bolivia (2002) 9.9 10.9 29.0 14.7
Chile (2003) 58.2 63.4 77.3 63.8
Colombia (2002) n.d. n.d. n.d. 18.6
Costa Rica (2000) 50.1 52.1 70.8 36.6
El Salvador (2000) 29.7 31.6 52.9 14.5
Mexico (2000) 38.5 39.3 62.2 19.2
Peru (2002) 13.9 14.4 31.3 23.7
Uruguay (2002) 55.3 65.0 78.6 87.1
Source: Rofman and Carranza (2005).
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the pension provided.13 In the past, the protection offered by the pension
system was poor. The level of the pensions and the replacement rates were
low and uncertain. In this sense, it is possible to argue that the law increased
the cost of not participating in the system. However, the effects of these
benefits were not extended to a larger group.
Another serious criticism of the reform is related to the level of com-
petition in the private pension system. The perception in recent years has
been that the four AFPs have behaved as an oligopoly and earned non-
competitive profits due to price agreements. The high return over equity
(ROE) and concentration indices as well as the high and unchanging fees
have been the fuel for dozens of legislative initiatives ranging from closing
the private pension system to arbitrarily setting administration charges.
They have also been the base of antitrust demands against each of the
AFPs at INDECOPI (Instituto Nacional para la Defensa de la Competencia
y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual, or National Institute for
the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property), the
competition watchdog. Nevertheless, all the demands were dismissed.
Typically, market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index (HHI). A first inspection of this indicator appears to
support the position of the critics (see Figure 13-3), but the figures are
deceiving as the number of firms is very small and not constant in the
sample. To correct the problem, we compute an alternative indicator com-
paring the computed HHI with the lowest possible value it can take given a
particular numbers of firms in the industry. The results in Figure 13-4 are
the opposite of what Figure 13-3 shows. As the smaller firms were absorbed,
the adjusted HHI of the remaining firms declined systematically. Given the
number of AFPs, the market could not be less concentrated: the market
shares of each AFP are almost 25 percent.
1,600
1,800
2,000
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,800
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Affiliates HHI Funds HHI
Figure 13-3. Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration indexes. (Source: Authors’ com-
putations based on SBS data n.d.)
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Figure 13-4. Herfindahl-Hirschman alternative indexes. (Source: Authors’ compu-
tations based on SBS data n.d.)
Critics also frequently argue that the administrative fees charged by the
AFPs reveal a lack of competition. Comparing Peru with other countries in
the region, critics such as Campodónico (2005) claim that the Peruvian sys-
tem is the second most expensive, just after the Argentine AFPs (see Table
13-5). However, a rapid inspection reveals that this conclusion is wrong. To
rank the systems, the critics use the ratio of the administrative fee to the
mandatory contribution rate. This indicator is flawed for two reasons. First,
the ratio will be higher in those countries where the mandatory contribu-
tion to individual accounts is lower. In Peru, the level of this contribution
is set by Congress, not by the AFPs. When Congress ‘temporarily’ reduced
Table 13-5 Contribution and Administrative Fee Rates
(December 31, 2004)
Country Contribution Rate to
Individual Account (1)
Administrative
Fee a(2)
(2)/(1) (%)
Argentina 4.47 2.53 56.8
Bolivia 10.00 2.21 22.1
Colombia 10.00 3.00 30.0
Chile 10.00 2.26 24.2
El Salvador 10.00 2.98 29.7
Mexico 4.88 1.38 28.9
Peru 8.00 3.19 39.9
Uruguay 11.95 2.90 24.7
Average 8.66 2.59 29.9
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FIAP (2005).
a Only includes administrative fee charged as a percentage of wage.
13-Kay-and-Sinha-c13 OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 351 of 358 August 20, 2007 17:40
13 / The Peruvian Pension Reform: Ailing or Failing? 351
Table 13-6 Average Commissions in Private Pension Systems (December 31,
2004)
Country Fixed
Fee US$
Var. Comm.
(% Wage)
Var. Comm.
(% Wage)
Var. Comm.
(% Pension Fund)
Var. Comm.
(% RR)
AFP Ins. co.
Argentina n/a 2.53 1.12 1.41 — —
Bolivia n/a 2.21 0.50 1.71 — a —
Colombia n/a 3.00 1.55 1.45 — 4.50
Costa Rica n/a — — — — 7.25
Chile 0.95 2.26 1.27 0.99 — —
El Salvador n/a 2.98 1.78 1.20 — —
Mexico n/a 1.38 1.38 — 0.33 —
Panama n/a — — — 1.26 —
Peru n/a 3.19 2.27 0.92 — —
Dominican Rep. n/a 1.50 0.50 1.00 — 28.75
Uruguay 0.43 2.90 1.94 0.96 0.002 —
Source: FIAP (2005).
a 0.2285 if the pension fund is less than US$1,000; 0.14 if the pension fund is more than
US$1,000 but less than US$1,200; 0.067 if the pension fund is more than US$1,200 but less
than US$1,500.
the rate of contribution from 10 to 8 percent in 1995, they made the system
more expensive. Following this reasoning, by restoring the original rate,
Peru would come close to the regional average.14
Second, the indicator is misleading, as it takes only the variable commis-
sion into account —that is, the fee charged as a percentage of a worker’s
wage. However, the AFPs across Latin America have differing administrative
charges. Some also include a fixed fee, while others apply a fee on the
size of the funds or on the return obtained by the funds (see Table 13-6).
Consequently, this indicator underestimates fees on systems that depend
less on the variable fees.
Carranza and Morón (2004) offer a better measure that allows com-
parisons among systems with different pricing schedules. Following James,
Smalhout, and Vittas (2001), we compute equivalent annual fees, or the
annualized value of all fee payments as a percentage of the workers’ wages.
The figures assume that the return on the funds and the mandatory contri-
bution are the same across systems and over time. The results, in Table 13-7,
show that while the cost of Peru’s pension system was above the regional
average, the discrepancy is not as high as previous studies have indicated.
Furthermore, with the recent reductions in fees, the Peruvian system is
among the less expensive ones in the region.
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Table 13-7 Equivalent Annual Fees (% of the Individual Pension
Fund) (December 31, 2004)
Country With Official
Contribution Rate (1)
Assuming 8% as
Contribution Rate (2)
Argentina 0.760 0.424
Bolivia 0.523 0.597
Colombia 0.484 0.494
Chile 0.304 0.380
El Salvador 0.398 0.497
Mexico 0.707 0.560
Peru 0.532 0.532
Uruguay 0.390 0.487
Average 0.512 0.496
Memo: Peru (2006) 0.374 0.467
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FIAP (2005).
Finally, pension fund firms have been criticized for excessively high
ROE. According to a report prepared by Gerens (2005), the private pen-
sion industry has the highest ROE displayed in the past 10 years by any
industry.15 Furthermore, by that measurement, two of the AFPs rank as first
and third best performers of the past decade.
Surprisingly, such a profitable market has not seen new entrants until this
year. A typical explanation is that high barriers deter potential competitors,
but the capital requirements for entry are not extremely large. Rather,
other local factors hinder investor participation in this market. First, high
uncertainty exists regarding the basic rules governing the system. Second,
substantial limitations are imposed by the informal sector on the size of
the potential market. Third, there is low price elasticity of affiliation and
contribution. Fourth, switching from one AFP to other was an involved
process in which the affiliate had to bear high transaction costs.16 In such
an environment, the most convenient method of entry was to buy an
existing firm.
A weakness in the system is the effect of the temporary reduction of the
contribution rate. Back in 1995, legislators were convinced that a reason-
able way to attract more affiliates into the system was to reduce temporarily
the contribution rate from 10 to 8 percent. However, they did not take the
possible effects on replacement rates into account. Moreover, the tempor-
ary change has become a permanent one that has reduced projections
of future pensions. A paper by Berstein and Ruiz (2004) suggests that
frequency of contributions does not depend on the rate of contribution.
If this is the case, then lowering the contribution rate will lead to lower
replacement rates but not to greater compliance.
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Another weakness is the inability to offer a response to the problem of
the lack of compliance in contributions. More than half of the affiliates do
not contribute regularly to their individual accounts. However, it is unclear
whether this is because the worker is no longer employed or because the
firm is not depositing the corresponding contribution. Both the SBS and
the Ministry of Labor have a very limited ability to enforce compliance.
Moreover, workers do not have the incentive to complain to their employers
out of fear they might be laid off.
The Pending Reforms
As discussed above, the common view is that the reform failed to increase
coverage, reduce administrative costs, or promote competition. The section
that follows discusses proposals that tackle those issues.
Refocus Government Intervention17
The most pressing question for a country reforming its pension system
is perhaps whether to close the old public system. This is a very difficult
political decision, because the workers in the transition period are signifi-
cantly affected. Compensating them increases the fiscal cost of reform but
avoiding a complete phaseout of the public system reduces the efficiency of
the private system and lessens the potential for reductions in administrative
costs. The tradeoff is clear, because in essence the public and the private
systems are serving the same clients.
In Peru, according to the most recent household survey, 77.5 percent of
the population older than 60 years does not have pension coverage. Even
if we include such informal social protection networks as retirees living
with their children, 46.5 percent of people older than 60 years are still
not covered against an income shock. This situation calls for a redefini-
tion of the role and commitment of the government in the postreform
period. Currently, its role is limited to supervising the private pension
system and offering pensions to those affiliated with the public system.
There is no effective universal MPG for the elderly. A World Bank report
argues that current government programs should cover only those that
comply with requisites of contributions and years of enrollment (WB 2004).
Currently, the public provider duplicates efforts in that the SNP and SPP
serve the same market in a situation in which the government is resource
constrained and in which a large part of the population has no benefits
whatsoever.
According to the report, pension system objectives require clarification.
These systems should prevent poverty in old age and smooth consumption
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in old age. Those objectives could be achieved by: introducing a uni-
versal noncontributory means-tested pension; redefining pillar one as a
mandatory pooling system with a crosssubsidized minimum pension; and
creating individual capitalization accounts that provide affiliates with pen-
sions consistent with their earnings. The report concludes that it is prefer-
able that the government focus its attention and resources to meet the
poverty-reduction objective through a collective system, whereas the private
pension system takes care of consumption-smoothing through individual
accounts. In this way, the pillars are clearly defined and complement each
other.
Recently, Carranza (2005) and Morón, Ponce, and Tejada (2005) esti-
mated the feasibility of adopting the World Bank proposal. Carranza finds
that setting up a universal pension system will increase coverage from 15 to
40 percent, with the less expensive alternative costing around 0.6 percent
of GDP annually. This does not take into account the administrative cost of
running a pillar-zero program and the possibility of targeting problems that
have swamped other social programs.18 Both papers find that setting up an
MPG in which the government fills only the gap not provided by individual
contributions and the profitability of the funds managed by AFPs is fiscally
feasible (costing around 0.05% of GDP annually). According to Morón,
Ponce, and Tejada (2005), a restructured MPG program could be used as a
source of additional funding to increase coverage for at least half a million
workers. Asking individuals to fund at least a part of their future pensions
will potentially free up government resources. However, phasing out the
SNP will prove difficult for political reasons.
In our opinion, there is room for private-sector involvement in each
of the pillars. The private pension providers could pay the universal ben-
efits, manage the collective insurance, and administer the capitalization
accounts. In this scenario, the role of the government would be restricted
to providing funds for the universal pension, offering guarantees for a
less restrictive MPG, improving the supervision and regulation of the AFP
industry, and isolating the system from political risks.
Promote Competition with More Flexible Rules
Under the current regulatory framework and until the system matures,
the dimension on which AFPs most often compete is price. Contrary to
what happens in any other industry, the AFPs have not been able to dif-
ferentiate their product by altering characteristics such as the liquidity of
the retirement savings, the portfolio composition, or the returns on the
pension fund. The administrative fee is the main differentiating factor,
but this also has its limitations. The AFPs were not allowed to offer price
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incentives to loyal affiliates until 2004, and even in that case the elasticity of
fee reductions is so low that this tool is ineffective.
Much of the current regulation was written during the early 1990s, when
the only reference was Chile’s groundbreaking experience. It was under-
standable that regulators were extremely cautious. For example, AFPs were
required to invest only in investment-grade securities, and they had to attain
a return similar to the average of the system. These restrictions promoted a
copycat strategy among AFPs that was exacerbated in the context of a rather
illiquid and underdeveloped financial market. In general, the strict limits
on portfolio management have created a situation in which differences
in the returns accumulated by the AFPs have to be measured using two
decimal points.
Only since 2005 has the SBS changed its pricing policies. AFPs can now
offer discounted fees to affiliates who sign contracts committing to stay with
the same provider for a fixed term (1–3 years). Along the same lines, the
SBS approved and regulated the creation of multifunds. In October 2005,
the AFPs started offering three types of pension funds that may better
meet the risk-return preferences of their affiliates. The previous scheme
imposed too much risk on the old affiliates and offered moderate returns
to the young. The new regulations allow individuals to invest voluntarily
in an AFP other than the one in which they have their mandatory account.
Nonetheless, if this initiative is not complemented with more flexible invest-
ment limits, the system will end up with three similar funds. Unfortunately,
the Central Bank—which has the last word on portfolio regulation—has
blocked the SBS proposal to raise the limit on investments in foreign
markets.
Another way to introduce more competition is to promote the voluntary
third pillar. For this, the SBS will have to introduce caps on contributions
to the mandatory second pillar. The potential problem with this proposal
is that if the ceiling is set too low, replacement rates may fall beyond
reasonable amounts. On the contrary, if the ceiling is too high, the market
for voluntary savings will be too thin to attract competitors beyond the AFPs
such as mutual funds or banks.
Conclusions
In summary, the pension reform in Peru has been a partial success. The
qualification is needed because the initial reforms were not as bold as
they should have been. Could we say emphatically that the private pension
system is safe from political interference in the near future? Unfortunately,
the answer is a resounding no—it is a government-mandated, privately
run system, not a private one. Sound policy requires taking a long-term
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perspective, an exercise that has never been an easy task for a government
in which competing pressing needs and an unpredictable political scenario
force policymakers to think myopically. Perhaps the size of the pension
fund and its considerable influence on the financial system will be enough
incentive to shift the policy debate toward long-term issues. Hopefully, as
the pension system matures and grows exponentially, politicians will change
their perspective.
The challenges ahead might seem insurmountable, especially regarding
increasing coverage, which is clearly linked to the formalization of the
economy and luring independent workers into the system. The system is
vulnerable to multiple risks given that Peru is a developing country with a
developing pension system. Nonetheless, the need for additional reforms
is clear. For that to happen, it will require political will to lead a pension
reform.
Notes
1 Not included in this chapter is a discussion of possible reforms of the military
and police pension systems.
2 In fact, this legislation only rephrased older Spanish legislation (Real Cédula of
February 8, 1803).
3 DL is short for decreto ley (literally, ‘law decree’).
4 There were attempts to end this system in both 1962 and 1974. This regime was to
be restricted to employees who had entered the public sector before 1962. However,
workers entered via special legislation in the 1980s (discussed below).
5 According to Schneider (2005), Peru ranks among the world’s top ten informal
economies.
6 An early but balanced account of the reform is found in Ortiz de Zevallos et al.
(1999). A more personal and passionate account of the reform can be found in
Roggero (1993). Roggero was a member of Congress until 1992 and the main
proponent of the pension reform during the early stages of the process.
7 Another set of legislative decrees were blocked by the constitutional court, which
by all accounts was controlled by the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
(APRA), the major opposition party. The pension reform (DL 724) was under
review by this court when it was dismissed after the 1992 coup.
8 A provision making the new system compulsory was part of the original executive
proposal but President Fujimori removed it from the final bill. A proposal to charge
higher fees in the public system (as an incentive for workers to join the private
system) was also scrapped, as was a later 1995 attempt to require new workers to
affiliate with the private system.
9 In 1995 the World Bank proposed to unify both systems but the proposal was
dismissed. See Kane (1995).
10 Moreover, recognition bonds faced two problems: (a) reliable contribution
records were absent and, (b) in most cases, actual salary records were also unavail-
able.
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11 For example, President García’s regionalization process was completely disman-
tled by President Fujimori, only to be revived by President Toledo. All these changes
happened in less than fifteen years.
12 According to the ILO (2005), in 2004 58% of Peru’s nonagricultural labor force
was in the informal sector, compared to 66.7% in Bolivia and 47.4% in Latin
America overall.
13 Mesa-Lago (2001) discusses the pros and cons of alternative coverage measures.
14 On the last day of the 2005 legislative session, Congress voted to return to the
original 10% contribution rate.
15 According to that report, the private pension system had an average 30.6% return
over equity compared to a financial sector average of only 7.7% in nominal terms.
16 This was changed in 2005 to allow affiliates to switch AFPs via the Internet and
without having to wait six months to make a new switch. The new procedure has
reduced the duration of the process from ten to two months.
17 This section is based on Carranza and Morón (2004).
18 Carranza (2005) simulates the cost of this program under two alternative tar-
geting rules. In one case, the beneficiaries are all elderly people living alone in
extreme poverty or in poverty and not receiving a pension benefit. In the other
case, the restriction of living alone is lifted. In the less expensive case, the pension
benefit is equivalent to 2/9 of the current minimum wage.
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